On the relevance of open market operations for the short-run effects of monetary policy by Andreas Schabert
On the Relevance of Open Market Operations for Short-run
E¤ects of Monetary Policy1
Andreas Schabert2
University of Cologne
This version: April 16, 2003
Abstract
This paper reexamines the role of open market operations for monetary
transmission and equilibrium determinacy. Money demand is due to
a cash constraint, while the central bank supplies money exclusively
via repurchase agreements. Though, the duration of holding money is
…nite, settlement of repurchase agreements avoids the Hahn-paradox.
We consider a legal restriction for open market operations by which
only government bonds are accepted in exchange for money. In this
case, agents care about open market operations when private debt earns
a higher interest than government bonds. The model is then it able
to generate liquidity e¤ects of monetary injections regardless whether
prices are ‡exible or set in a staggered way. Money is neutral in the
former case, whereas a monetary injection leads to a real and a nominal
expansion in the latter case. A nominal interest rate peg is associated
with a uniquely determined price level for ‡exible prices and equilibrium
determinacy for sticky prices, and is equivalent to a constant money
growth policy.
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Central banks in most industrial countries exert control over money via open market op-
erations. Herein, money is supplied in exchange for risk free securities discounted with a
short-run nominal interest rate. Hence, the costs of cash acquisition depend on the current
discount rate and the availability of collateral. Monetary theory, however, has not reached a
consensus on the e¤ects of open market operations and even claimed open market operations
to be irrelevant (see, e.g., Wallace, 1981, or, Sargent and Smith, 1987).3 In accordance with
the latter view, recent contributions to the monetary policy literature commonly disregard
open market operations assuming that money is injected via lump-sum transfers (see Walsh,
1997). In this paper, we depart from this approach and introduce open market operations
similar to Drèze and Polemarchakis (2000) and Bloise et al. (2002). In particular, we as-
sume that money is supplied via repurchase agreements such that households temporarily
acquire money in exchange for securities discounted by a short-run nominal interest rate.
Money is demanded by households due to a Clower (1967)-constraint and does not serve
as a store of value. Hence, money is ‡ow and, thus, serves as a true medium of exchange,
rather than treated as an asset ’demanded to be held at the end of the period’ (see Hellwig,
1993). Though, the duration of households’ money holdings does not exceed the length of one
period, settlement of repurchase agreements avoids Hahn’s (1965) paradox, i.e., the puzzle
about how to guarantee that money is held over a …nite horizon.
We develop a business cycle model where aggregate prices are allowed to be set by monop-
olistically competitive retail …rms in a staggered way. Households’ …nancial wealth comprises
contingent claims on other households and government bonds. In each period they can ac-
quire money from the central bank via repurchase agreements. We impose a legal restriction
for open market operations, by which government bonds are exclusively accepted as collat-
eral. The central assumption is that households internalize this particular money market
restriction when they decide on their optimal plan. When private debt earns a higher inter-
est than public debt, open market operations matter and households’ demand for government
bonds is determined by their transaction demand for cash and the prevailing repo rate. As a
consequence, public debt policy needs to be speci…ed in an explicit way given that Ricardian
equivalence now does not hold. When, however, the expected returns from both assets are
identical, open market operations are irrelevant and the model can be reduced to a set of
equilibrium conditions isomorphic to the consensus monetary business cycle model, as, e.g.,
applied by Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford (2002). Given that we are primarily interested
3More recently, Dupor (2001) has shown that open market operations are not irrelevant when they imply
the …scal policy regime to be non-Ricardian.
2in the former scenario, we show that there exists a well-behaved steady state with a positive
spread and derive the local dynamics and monetary policy e¤ects in its neighborhood.
Starting with the case where the central bank sets the growth rate of money, it is shown
that a monetary injection raises prices and reduces the nominal interest rate regardless
whether prices are ‡exible or sticky. This e¤ect, which is repeatedly found in the data
and also known as the liquidity e¤ect (see Christiano et al., 1999),4 can hardly be generated
in conventional sticky price models (see Galí, 2001, or, Andrés et al., 2002). When prices are
sticky the model further predicts a real expansion. In the case where the central bank sets the
nominal interest rate on government bonds, the model with relevant open market operations
lacks some unpleasant features of conventional models. A nominal interest rate peg is asso-
ciated with a uniquely determined price level even for ‡exible prices and without relying on
…scal policy to be speci…ed in a non-Ricardian way, as, e.g., in Woodford (1994) or Benhabib
et al. (2001). It is further shown that a central bank can switch between these instruments
without changing the equilibrium sequences of the sticky price version, whereas an analogous
exercise is impossible when open market operations are irrelevant. Equilibrium determinacy
in the sticky price case does not require the ful…llment of the so-called Taylor-principle (see
Woodford, 2001) when the central bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent on in‡ation
rates. On the other hand, the central bank should refrain from setting the interest rate in a
highly reactive way to avoid the economy to be destabilized in cases where debt interest pay-
ments are not completely tax …nanced. Macroeconomic stability, thus, demands monetary
policy to be coordinated with …scal policy.5
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. In section 3 we
present results for the ‡exible and sticky price version for money growth policy. The case of
an interest rate policy is examined in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The outline of the model Household-…rm units are endowed with government bonds and
claims on other households carried over from the previous period. They produce a wholesale
good employing labor from all households. Aggregate uncertainty is due to monetary policy
shocks, which are realized at the beginning of the period. Then goods are produced and asset
markets open, where households can freely trade in government bonds and in contingent
claims. Money demand is induced by assuming that purchases of consumption goods are
4Limited participation and segmentation of asset markets are commonly recommended as solutions for the
so-called liquidity puzzle (see Christiano et al., 1997, and, Alvarez et al., 2002)
5The destabilizing e¤ect of aggressive interest rate policy due to ’debt-interest spirals’ is also examined by
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) in an overlapping generations framework.
3restricted by a liquidity constraint. The central bank supplies money exclusively via open
market operations, i.e., via repurchase agreements, where money is traded in exchange for
securities. Hence, households can acquire money to an amount equal to the discounted
asset value.6 After goods are traded, households repurchase securities from the central bank.
Hence, there is no accumulation of money. In appendix 6.1 we provide a su¢cient condition
for households not willing to carry over money from one period to the other.
In order to allow for a nominal rigidity, which is commonly perceived as the main source for
short run non-neutrality of money, we introduce monopolistically competitive retail …rms, who
di¤erentiate the wholesale goods. To minimize distortions induced by liquidity constraints,
we assume that households …rst buy coupons for the di¤erentiated consumption goods from
the retail …rms, which enables the latter to purchase the wholesale good from the household-
…rm units. Given these assumption, the log-linearized approximation of the model nests the
prototype New Keynesian model.
Households Lower (upper) case letters denote real (nominal) variables. There is an in…nite
number of time periods t (t =0 ;1;2;:::). Let st =( s0;::::;st) denote the history of events up
to date t and g(stjst¡1) denote probability of state st and, thus, of the history st conditional
on the history st¡1 at date t ¡ 1. The initial state, s0,i sg i v e ns ot h a tg(s0)=1 . There is a
continuum of perfectly competitive household-…rm units distributed uniformly over (0;1).I n
each period t ah o u s e h o l dj 2 (0;1) consumes a composite goods c(j;st) and supplies working
time l(j;st)=
R 1
0 lk(j;st)dk to household-…rm units, where lk(j;st) denotes the working time
of households j in …rm k.F u r t h e r ,h o u s e h o l dj produces a wholesale good x(j;st) using the
technology: x(j;st)=
R 1
0 lj(k;st)dk, and sells the wholesale good to retail …rms charging a





¯tg(st) u(c(j;st);l(j;st)); with 0 <¯<1; (1)
where ¯ denotes the subjective discount factor.
Assumption 1 The utility function u is assumed to be strictly increasing in consumption c,
strictly decreasing in labor l, strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable with respect to
both arguments, satis…es the usual Inada conditions, and is additively separable.
We separate the household problem into a temporal and an intertemporal part. In the
temporal part they make their optimal decisions on production and on the composition of
6One can equally assume that …nancial intermediaries engage in open market operations on the behalf of
households.
4consumption. Pro…t maximizing demand for labor lj(k;st) implies
P(st)w(st)=Pw(j;st); (2)
where P(st) denotes the aggregate price level and w(st) the real wage rate. Let c(j;st) be
consumption of a composite good which is de…ned as a CES aggregate of the di¤erentiated










where ² is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two retail goods. Let P(i;st)









Minimizing costs for purchasing a unit of the composite good leads to the following optimal







We now turn to the intertemporal part. At the beginning of period t households are endowed
with …nancial wealth A(j;st¡1) which comprises government bonds holdings B(j;st¡1) and
state contingent claims on other households D(j;st¡1):A(j;st¡1)=B(j;st¡1)+D(j;st¡1).
Both assets exhibits payo¤s contingent on the aggregate state st.L e tz(st+1;s t) be the price
in state st of a claim that pays o¤ one unit of currency if and only if state st+1 occurs.
Before agents enter the asset market, the aggregate shocks arrive, goods are produced, and
wages are credited on checkable accounts. Then households enter the assets market, where
t h e i ra s s e t sh o l d i n g sp a yo ¤D(j;st¡1) and R(st)B(j;st¡1) and the new portfolio of contingent
claims costs
P
st+1jst z(st+1;s t)g(st+1jst)D(j;st). To acquire cash, households participate in
repurchase agreements, where they can exchange interest bearing assets Bc(j;st) for cash
M(j;st).T h e a m o u n t M(j;st) supplied by the central bank equals the discounted value





; with Bc(j;st) ¸ 0: (5)
Then the goods market opens. We assume that the purchase of consumption goods is subject









The modi…cation of the Clower (1967) constraint, i.e., the term in the square brackets, is
introduced to avoid the cash-credit good distortion between consumption and leisure, which
would unnecessarily make the model structure more complicated (see, Jeanne, 1998). The
household receives a labor income P(st)w(st)l(j;st) and have to pay P(st)w(st)
R 1
0 lj(k;st)dk
for the wage outlays for its own …rm. Assuming that wages are credited at demand deposits
and that checks drawn on these accounts are accepted as a means of payment, we end up
with (6). On the other hand, the household receives cash by selling its product x(j;st) and
in form of pro…ts of retail …rms P(st)
R 1
0 !j(i;st)di such that they leave the goods market









Thus, the cash constraint can be combined to M(j;st) ¸ Pw(st)x(j;st)+P(st)
R 1
0 !j(i;st)di.
Then repurchase agreements are completed, i.e., M(j;st) is bought back by the central bank
and the households receive Bc(j;st)=R(st). To allow open market operations to play a non-
negligible role, we impose the legal restriction that only government bonds are accepted by
the central bank such that
Bc(j;st) · B(j;st): (7)
Given that the opportunity costs of money accumulation is equal to the expected return
from contingent claims, the utility of household j will not be higher for a plan where they
carry over cash from one period to the other. Hence, we disregard accumulation of money
















where ¿ denotes a lump-sum tax. We further assume that households are aware of the fact
7Appendix 6.1 provides su¢cient conditions for households not to carry over money from one period to the
other.
6that their access to cash is restricted by their holdings of government bonds. This restricting
is obviously irrelevant when they can issue private debt earning an interest rate not higher
than the interest rate on government bonds. However, as the monetary authority sets the
latter, a positive spread Rd(st)¡R(st) cannot generally be ruled out such that they internalize





when they derive their optimal decisions. Maximizing (1) subject to the asset market con-








z(st+v;s t) ¸ 0; (10)
the goods market constraint (6) and the open market constraint (9) for a given initial value
of total nominal wealth A(j;s0) leads to the following conditions for consumption, leisure,














































and (6) and (9), where ¸ denotes the shadow price of wealth, Ã the Lagrange multiplier on
the cash-in-advance constraint, and ´ the Lagrange multiplier on the open market constraint
(9). The cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality when Ã is positive. In the optimum
(10) further holds with equality serving as the transversality condition. We assume that
private debt is issues in form of one period bonds that costs one unit of currency in t and
pays Rd(st+1) in st+1, implying
Rd(st+1)=z(st+1;s t)¡1:
7Retailer There is a monopolistically competitive retail sector with a continuum of retail
…rms indexed on i 2 (0;1). Each retail …rm, owned by the households, buys a quantity
xi(j;st) of the wholesale good produced by household j at price Pw(st).W ea s s u m et h a ta
retailer is able to di¤erentiate the wholesale good without further costs. The di¤erentiated
retail good y(i;st)=
R 1
0 xi(j;st)dj is then sold at a price P(i;st). We assume that retailers set
their prices according to Calvo’s (1983) staggered price setting model. The retailer changes
its price when he receives a signal, which arrives with in a given period with probability
(1 ¡ Á), where 0 · Á<1. A retailer who does not receive a signal adjusts its price by the
steady state aggregate in‡ation rate ¼,s u c ht h a tP(i;st)=¼P(i;st¡1). On the other hand,
a retailer that receives a price change signal in period t chooses an optimal price e P(i;st) to






v q(st+v;s t)e !(i;st+v;s t); (18)
where q(st+1;s t) ´ z(st+1;s t)g(st+1jst) is the stochastic discount factor and e !(i;st+v;s t)
denotes his real pro…ts in period t + v for own prices not being adjusted after period t :
P(st)e !(i;st+v;s t)=e P(i;st)y(i;st+v)¡Pw(st+v)
R 1
0 xi(j;st+v)dj. Maximizing (18) subject to
the demand function (4), taking the price Pw(st) of the wholesale good and the aggregate
…nal goods price index P(st) and the initial price level P(s0) as given, yields the …rst-order













v q(st+v;s t)x(st+v)P(st+v)²¼(1¡²)v : (19)
Public sector The public sector consists of a …scal and a monetary authority. The mone-
tary authority supplies money in open market operations in exchange for government bonds
and transfers the seignorage to the …scal authority. The budget constraint of the central bank
is given by
Bc(st) ¡ M(st)=( R(st) ¡ 1)M(st)=P(st)¿c(st);
where ¿c denotes transfers to the …scal authority. The latter issues risk free one period bonds
earning a gross nominal interest rate R(st), collects lump-sum taxes ¿ from the households
and receives the transfer from the monetary authority ¿c
R(st)B(st¡1)=B(st)+P(st)¿c(st)+P(st)¿(st): (20)
We assume that the central bank sets the growth rate of money ¹(st)=M(st)=M(st¡1)
according to: ¹(st)=¹1¡½¹(st¡1)½ exp("t),w i t h0 · ½<1 and 1 ¸ ¹.T h ei n n o v a t i o n"t has
8an expected value zero and is serially uncorrelated. The …scal policy regime is characterized






; with 0 <#· 1. (21)
The …scal policy parameter # governs the portion of government expenditures covered by tax
receipts. Using the …scal policy rule (21) to eliminate the transfers in the budget constraint
(20) leads to the following consolidated budget constraint of the public sector
B(st)=
£
(1 ¡ #)(R(st) ¡ 1) + 1
¤
B(st¡1): (22)
Hence, a higher value for the …scal policy parameter # reduces the growth rate of government
bonds. Given that #>0 it can immediately be seen from (22) that solvency of the public









is always satis…ed. In other words, our speci…cation of public policy is Ricardian.8
Symmetry and market clearing Given that households are symmetric we know that
c(j;st)=c(st);l (j;st)=l(st);l j(k;st)=ld(k;st)=ld(st);m (j;st)=m(st);
m(j;st)=m(st);b (j;st)=b(st);b c(j;st)=bc(st);x (j;st)=x(st);
¸(j;st)=¸(st);´ (j;st)=´(st);Ã (j;st)=Ã(st);d (j;st)=d(st);
where real values for the assets are denoted by lower case letters. Aggregation of retailer
pro…ts yields P(st)!(st)=P(st) ¡ Pw(st)y(st). Market clearing further implies
l(st)=ld(st);y (st)=x(st);d (st)=0 ; m(st)=m(st);a (st)=b(st);y (st)=c(st):
In what follows we restrict our attention on the cases where the cash constraint is binding
(c(st)=m(st)). For this, it is su¢cient that the nominal interest rate on government bonds
Rt ¡ 1 is strictly positive (see 15) such that Ãt > 0.
8An analysis of open market operations in an environment with a non-Ricardian …scal policy regime can
be found in Dupor (2001).
93 Money growth policy and liquidity e¤ects
In this section we …rst derive the conditions for open market operations to be relevant. Then
we examine the e¤ects of a money growth shock ("f > 0 and "t =08t : t 6= f), when prices
are ‡exible and sticky. To lighten the notion, the reference to the state is suppressed.
3.1 Open market operations
The model features two fundamentally di¤erent versions depending on the relevance of open
market operations, i.e., if the open market constraint (9) enters the set of equilibrium condi-
tions as an equality. When open market operations are not legally restricted by (7), which
demands that only government bonds are accepted as collateral, open market operations
are obviously irrelevant as money can be acquired in exchange for securities issued by the
households themselves. However, even if open market operations are legally restricted by (7),
open market operations are irrelevant as long as households’ government bonds holdings are
su¢ciently large such that Bt ¸ Bc
t always holds. Given the timing of events and markets
in our model, households can easily a¤ord the latter when government bonds earn the same
interest as private bonds (Rt = Rd
t). In this case, households can freely issue private debt to
invest costlessly in government bonds to any amount. In contrast, when the interest rate on
government bonds is smaller than the interest rate on private bonds, this strategy becomes
costly such that households are willing to minimize on the interest rate loss. In this case, they
will only hold government bonds equal to desired amount of money times the actual discount
rate, Bt = Bc
t and the open market constraint (9) is binding. This result is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Open market operations matter (´t > 0 ) Bt = Bc
t)i ¤Et[Rd
t+1¡Rt+1] > 0.
Proof. The claim made in the proposition immediately follows from the …rst order condition
(14), which reads ´t = ¯Et[
¸t+1
¼t+1(Rd
t+1 ¡ Rt+1)] and from (16). ¥
Whether the open market constraint is binding or not has an important consequence for
the relation between government bonds, money, and, thus, consumption. Suppose that the
expected spread between the interest rate on private debt and the interest rate on government
bonds is positive. According to the result in proposition 1 the open market constraint then
demands that money and, thus, consumption is linked to real government bonds ct = bc
tRt =
bt=Rt. Otherwise, the amount of securities traded in open market operations bc
t is not directly
linked to public debt and to the remainder of the model. We proceed with the case of ‡exible
prices.
103.2 Flexible prices
I nw h a tf o l l o w sw er e d u c et h es e to fe n d o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e sa n dr e s t r i c to u ra t t e n t i o no nt h e
response of in‡ation, consumption, the interest rate on government bonds, and households
assets to changes in the money growth rate. When prices are ‡exible (Á =0 ) the state equals
the realization of the shock to the money growth rule (st = "t) such that the model exhibits
no sluggishness. Further using that ct = lt and at = bt and introducing the in‡ation rate
¼t ´ Pt=Pt¡1, we can de…ne the equilibrium in …ve endogenous variables. It should be noted
that the shadow prices ¸t and ´t can be recursively determined by (13) and (14). Though,
the shadow price for the open market constraint matters is clearly relevant in equilibrium,
we make use of the fact that it is actually the sign of ´t that governs the evolution of the
variables of interest. Hence, we are able to characterize the equilibrium contingent on the
sign of ´t.
De…nition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium of the ‡exible price model with Ãt > 0 is a















=¯ if ´t =0
; (26)
at =[(1¡ #)(Rt ¡ 1) + 1]at¡1¼¡1
t ; (27)
mt¼t=mt¡1 =¹t,w i t h ¹t = ¹1¡½¹
½
t¡1 exp("t); (28)
and the transversality condition for a given initial value A0.
In the ‡exible price environment the mark-up of the retail price over the wholesale price is
constant and given by ²
²¡1. H e n c e ,t h er e a lw a g ei s ,b y( 2 ) ,a l s oc o n s t a n t : wt = w = ²¡1
² .
Given that the real wage is constant, consumption is uniquely pinned down by (24): ct = c.
This property, which simpli…es the analysis, is actually a virtue of avoiding the cash-credit
good distortion between consumption and leisure by applying a modi…ed cash-constraint.
The behavior of the in‡ation rate and the nominal interest rate on government bonds can
now directly be deduced from the equilibrium conditions (24)-(28). We start with the case
where open market operations matter. Given that consumption is …xed, a money growth
policy ¹t = mt¼t=mt¡1 implies by Mt = Ptc that the in‡ation rate equals the money growth
rate: ¹t = ¼t. Turning to the interest rate on government bonds, we use (27) and at = cRt
to obtain




11Equation (29) indicates that the nominal interest rate Rt declines for a rise in the money
growth rate given that we assumed the …scal authority to satisfy #>0. However, this reaction
is opposed to the one for the case where open market operations are irrelevant (´t =0 ). In
this case, the model exhibits no liquidity e¤ect and the nominal interest rate rises due to
the so-called expected in‡ation e¤ect (see Christiano et al., 1997). The following proposition
summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 (Liquidity e¤ect, Á =0 ) Suppose that prices are ‡exible. Then an expan-
sionary money growth shock is accompanied by a rise in in‡ation and
1. a declining nominal interest rate if the open market constraint is binding (´t > 0), and
2. a non-declining nominal interest rate if the open market constraint is not binding (´t =
0).
Proof. The …rst part of the proposition immediately follows from the former discussion and
from (29). In the case where ´t =0 , the nominal interest rate R,w h i c hi se q u a lt oRd in





.G i v e nt h a tct = c holds, the nominal
interest rate rises with the expected future in‡ation Rt = ¯¡1Et¼t+1,w i t h¼t = ¹t. ¥
When ¹t is not serially correlated (½ =0 ), the nominal interest rate is constant for ´t =0 .
However, when we allow that the money growth rate exhibits a positive autocorrelation
(½>0), the model predicts, by (13), a rise in the nominal interest rate. This equilibrium for
this version is, thus, uniquely pinned down. Using the equation (29) we can further examine
the conditions for the model with ´t > 0 to exhibit a unique rational expectations equilibrium
path which converges to the steady state.9 Actually, it remains to check if the di¤erential
equation (29) is unstable such that the forward looking variable Rt is uniquely determined.
The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 3 (Determinacy, ´t > 0) Suppose that prices are ‡exible and the open market
constraint is binding. Then the model exhibits a unique rational expectations equilibrium path
converging to the steady state.
Proof. To establish the claim made in the proposition, we log-linearize the deterministic
v e r s i o no fe q u a t i o n( 2 9 )a tt h es t e a d ys t a t e : ¹b Rt =( 1¡ #)Rb Rt +[( 1¡ #)R + #] b Rt¡1,w h e r e
b Rt is de…ned as b Rt = log(Rt=R). Using the steady state restrictions ¹ =( 1¡ #)R + #,w e
e n du pw i t hb Rt =
¹
# b Rt¡1. Hence, the eigenvalue is unstable (including the unit root) and,
thus, the model is uniquely determined given that ¹ ¸ # is ensured by assumption. ¥
9The compete set of steady state conditions can be found in the appendix 6.2.
123.3 Staggered price setting
In this section we consider the case where prices are not completely ‡exible (Á>0). In order
to analyze the e¤ects of a monetary injection, we take a linear approximation of the model at
the steady state. The steady state of the model, which consistent with the ’monetary facts’ of
McCandless and Weber (2001) regardless whether open market operations matter or not, is
presented in appendix 6.2. The model now additional features an aggregate supply constraint
stemming from the partial price adjustment of retailers. It can be derived by log-linearizing
the …rst order condition (19) and using the assumption on non-price-adjusting retailer. As
shown in appendix 6.3, the evolution of the in‡ation rate can then be summarized by the
following aggregate supply constraint:
b ¼t = Âc mct + ¯Etb ¼t+1;Â ´ (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¯Á)Á¡1 > 0; (30)
where b ¼t denotes percent deviations of ¼t from the steady state value ¼ and mct = Pw
t =Pt(=
wt) denotes the retailer’s real marginal costs. We further log-linearize and reduce the re-
maining equilibrium conditions of the model at the steady state to obtain an analytically
tractable representation. The equilibrium of the linearized model with a staggered price
setting is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 2 A rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linear approximation to the sticky





b at ¡ b Rt; if ´t > 0
Etb ct+1 ¡ (b Rt ¡ Etb ¼t+1)=¾ if ´t =0
; (31)
b mt =b ct; (32)
b ¼t =¯Etb ¼t+1 + °1b ct; (33)
b at =b at¡1 + °2 b Rt ¡ b ¼t; (34)
b mt = b mt¡1 ¡ b ¼t + b ¹t; with b ¹t = ½b ¹t¡1 + "t; (35)
with °1 ´Â(¾ + À) > 0;° 2 ´
¹ ¡ #
¹







and the transversality condition for given initial values A0 and P0.
A closer look at the equilibrium conditions reveals that real …nancial wealth and, thus, the
real value of government debt outstanding only a¤ects consumption and in‡ation in the
case where open market operations matter (´t > 0). Otherwise, the equilibrium sequences of
consumption, in‡ation, real balances, and the nominal interest rate are completely una¤ected
by real wealth, given that they are already determined by the conditions (31), (32), (33) and
13the money growth rule (35). Real wealth and, thus, real government debt can recursively be
determined by (34). Furthermore, the public …nancing decision, which is represented by the
parameter # governing the ratio of tax to debt …nancing, is also irrelevant, except for the
sequence of real debt. This property, which our model with ´t =0shares with the majority
of monetary business cycle models, is known as debt neutrality or Ricardian equivalence. The
more interesting property for the novel version is summarized in the following proposition.
Remark 1 When prices are sticky and the open market constraint is binding, Ricardian
equivalence does not hold.
Ricardian non-equivalence immediately follows from the fact that # a¤ects the evolution of
real wealth by (34), while the latter alters the access to money and, thus, the ability to
consume as revealed by the condition in the upper row of (31). To discriminate between the
two cases, we derive a particular steady state condition for the central bank which ensures
that the open market constraint binds (´>0). The result is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 (Steady state with ´>0) Suppose that the …scal policy is su¢ciently re-
active such that #>1¡¯. Then there exists a steady state where the open market constraint
is binding (´>0) if the central bank sets its target money growth rate ¹ such that ¹<¹,
with ¹ ´ #=[1 ¡ (1 ¡ #)=¯] > 1.
Proof. The steady state demands ¼
¯ = Rd, R =( ¹ ¡ #)=(1 ¡ #) (see appendix 6.2). Thus,
¹<¹ ensures that R<
¹
¯ = Rd implying ´>0. Further, existence of a particular ¹,w h i c h
requires that 1 < ¹,i sg u a r a n t e e db y1 <¯ . ¥
Hence, we can identify cases where the open market constraint is binding by referring to
a restriction for the long-run money growth rate (¹<¹). This strategy further requires
that the support for the innovations " is small enough such that ´t > 0 also holds in the
neighborhood of the steady state.
Before we turn to the model’s solution, we examine the local determinacy properties
of the model with a binding open market constraint. In particular, we want to derive the
conditions for the model to exhibit a unique and stable equilibrium path. Given that there
is one endogenous state variable (b at¡1), this requires exactly one eigenvalue of the model in
(36) to lie inside the unit circle. The following proposition summarizes the local determinacy
result.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium determiancy, ´t > 0) Suppose that prices are rigid and the
open market constraint is binding. Then the model exhibits a unique rational expectations
equilibrium path converging to the steady state.
14Proof. The model with ´t > 0 given in de…nition 2 can easily be reduced to a 2 £ 2 system




























where we used that the constant money growth rule implies the following solution for the
nominal interest rate: b Rt = ¡¼#¡1b ¹t. The characteristic polynomial of M¡1
0 M1 is f(X)=
X2 ¡
¯+°1+1
¯ X + 1
¯.G i v e nt h a tf(0) is equal to 1=¯ and, therefore, strictly positive and f(1)
is negative f(1) = ¡°1=¯ < 0; the model exhibits one eigenvalue lying between zero and one
and one unstable eigenvalue. ¥
Once we know that the model is locally determined, we can easily derive the impact e¤ects
of a monetary injection on the endogenous variables of the model. For this we use that the
state space now features an endogenous state, st =( at¡1;b ¹t), such that the general solution
form of (36) is given by
b at =±ab at¡1 + ±a"b ¹t; b ¼t = ±¼ab at¡1 + ±¼"b ¹t; (37)
b mt =b ct = ±cab at¡1 + ±c"b ¹t; b Rt = ±rab at¡1 + ±r"b ¹t:
Using that ±a 2 (0;1) and applying the method of undetermined coe¢cients, we are able to
identify the signs of the impact multiplier which are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Monetary policy e¤ects, ´t > 0) Suppose that prices are rigid and the
open market constraint is binding. Then an expansionary money growth shock leads to
1. a rise in consumption and real balances (@b ct=@"t = @ b mt=@"t > 0),
2. a decline in real wealth (@b at=@"t < 0) and the nominal interest rate (@ b Rt=@"t < 0), and
3. a rise in the in‡ation rate (@b ¼t=@"t > 0)i f#># ,w i t h # ´ 1¡¯°1=(1¡±a+°1) < 1.
Proof. See appendix 6.4.
Hence, the solution of the model reveals that a monetary injection leads to qualitative impact
e¤ects which are in accordance with common priors about monetary policy e¤ects on real
activity and prices. However, for the response of the latter to be positive, the degree of …scal
responsiveness should be su¢ciently large (#># ). The model further predicts that real
wealth declines in response to a monetary injection, which is mainly caused by the surge in
15in‡ation. Most importantly, proposition 6 states that the model always generates a liquidity
e¤ect.
As in the case where prices were ‡exible, the latter result (a liquidity e¤ect) can hardly
be found in conventional sticky price models (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 1997, Galí, 2001,
or, Andrès et al., 2002). In the version of our model where open market operations are
irrelevant we …nd that a liquidity e¤ects can only occur when the inverse of the elasticity
of substitution, ¾ ´¡uc
uccc, exceeds one given that the autocorrelation of the money growth
p r o c e s si ss u ¢ c i e n t l ys m a l l .
Proposition 7 (Monetary policy e¤ects, ´t =0 ) Suppose that prices are rigid and that
the open market constraint is not binding. Then the equilibrium is uniquely determined and
a monetary expansion leads to
1. a rise in consumption, real balances, and in‡ation (@b ct=@"t;@b mt=@"t;@ b ¼t=@"t > 0),
2. a decline in the nominal interest rate (@ b Rt=@"t < 0)i f½<1 ¡ ±m and ¾>¾ (½),w i t h
¾(½) ¸ 1; and ¾0(½) > 0:
Proof. See appendix 6.5.
4 Interest rate policy, determinacy, and policy equivalence
Consider that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate R. Identifying the monetary
policy instrument in this way is actually more realistic and in line with the recent monetary
policy literature (see, Clarida, et al., 1999). However, several studies have shown that an
interest rate policy can lead to price level indeterminacy and can easily destabilize the econ-
omy by allowing for multiple equilibrium paths (see, e.g., Benhabib et al., 2001, or, Carlstrom
and Fuerst, 2001). In contrast, it can easily be shown that our model is not associated with
nominal indeterminacy for an interest rate peg.10 This result is summarizes in the following
proposition.
Proposition 8 (Price level determinacy, Á =0 ) Suppose that prices are ‡exible. Then
an interest rate peg Rt = R is associated with
1. price level indeterminacy if the open market constraint not binding (´t =0 ), and
2. a uniquely determined price level if the open market constraint is binding (´t > 0).
Proof. Recall that the equilibrium is de…ned for a given initial value for …nancial wealth
A0 and that …nancial wealth evolves according to At = ®At¡1 ) At = ®tA0,w i t h® ´
10This result is closely related to the …nding in Canzoneri and Diba (2000) showing that prices level inde-
terminacy can be resolved when government bonds serve as a means of payment.
16(1 ¡ #)R + #>0 (see de…nition 1). Hence, price level determinacy requires a uniquely
determined value for real …nancial wealth at = At=Pt.F o r ´t =0 , an interest rate peg
…xes the in‡ation rate by ¼ = R¯. While the growth rate of real …nancial wealth is given
by at=at¡1 = ®=(R¯), its level cannot be determined. For ´t > 0, real …nancial wealth is
uniquely determined by at = a = Rc, allowing for the determination of the price level by
Pt = At=at = ®tA0=(cR). ¥
Regarding the consensus monetary business cycle framework with sticky prices, which is
represented by the version with ´t =0 , local determinacy requires the central bank to set
the nominal interest rate in an active way (see Woodford, 2001). On the other hand, an
interest rate peg leads to local indeterminacy given that …scal policy is Ricardian (#>0). In
contrast, the version of our model where the open market constraint is binding does not allow
for multiple equilibrium paths in the case of an peg. This feature immediately follows from
the property that a constant interest rate is equivalent to a constant money growth policy
and from proposition 5.
Proposition 9 (Policy equivalence, Á>0;´ t > 0) Suppose that prices are rigid and the
open market constraint is binding. Then an interest rate peg Rt = R is associated with a
uniquely determined equilibrium and leads to the identical fundamental solution as a constant
money growth policy ¹t = ¹.
Proof. The claim made in the proposition immediately follows from the solution for the
nominal interest rate b Rt = ¡¼#¡1"
¹
t implying Rt = R for a deterministic money growth rule
"t =0and from the local determinacy property derived in proposition 5. ¥
The fact that the central bank can switch between its instruments for ´t > 0 without altering
the allocation and, thus, the determinacy properties of the model is not self-evident. It is
one the one hand based on the fact that money acquisition is costly for households when
Rd
t ¡ Rt > 0. On the other hand, the change in the policy instrument is not associated
with a change in the state space dimension of the model given that real wealth remains the
single predetermined state variable of the fundamental solution. On the contrary, the state
space dimension changes with an instrument switch in the case where open market operations
are irrelevant (´t =0 ). The reason for this is the validity of Ricardian equivalence which
implies that the real wealth is now an irrelevant state variable. Hence, money growth policy
introduces a new state variable (real balances), while interest rate policy leaves the set of
endogenous states empty. Consequently, a central bank cannot replace an exogenous money
growth policy by an exogenous interest rate policy without changing the allocation. This
result is summarized in the following proposition.
17Proposition 10 (Equilibrium indeterminacy, Á>0, ´t =0 ) Suppose that prices are rigid
and the open market constraint is not binding. Then an interest rate peg is non-equivalent
with a constant money growth policy and leads to multiple equilibrium paths converging to the
steady state.
Proof. The equilibrium conditions (31) and (32) imply that an interest rate peg implements
a sequences of money growth rates satisfying b ¹t =
¡
1 ¡ ¾¡1¢
b ¼t, such that ¹t = ¹ only holds
if ¾ =1 . While this property only refers to a structural identity, we want to show that
both regimes lead to non-equivalent solutions. This result follows from the fact that real
balances mt¡1 = Mt¡1=Pt¡1 is a relevant predetermined variable when the central bank sets
the money growth rate in a sticky price environment, whereas the economy is entirely forward-
looking in the case of an interest rate peg such that the fundamental solution exhibits no
predetermined variable. Recalling that the coe¢cients on the endogenous state variable are
non-zero in the case of the money growth policy, the state space representations are obviously
non-equivalent for both regimes. The second claim made in the proposition directly follow
from the determinacy condition presented in section 5 in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) for a
model featuring the equilibrium conditions (31) and (33) for ´t =0 . ¥
T u r n i n gb a c kt ot h ec a s ew h e r e´t > 0, an interest rate peg was shown to lead to real de-
terminacy, while the stability of equilibrium paths is not yet guaranteed for the case where
the nominal interest rate is set contingent on changes in in‡ation, such as in the often rec-
ommended Taylor-rule (see, Woodford, 2001). Consider the simple rule b Rt = ½¼b ¼t and that
the central bank chooses a high in‡ation elasticity ½¼. W h e ni n ‡ a t i o nr i s e st h e nt h e… s c a l
authority can be forced to issue new debt – for # smaller than one – if the associated rise
in Rt is su¢ciently high such that debt obligations rise. Hence, a highly aggressive interest
rate policy might lead to debt spirals when the …scal authority is less responsible (small #).11
This results is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (Equilibrium determinacy, Á>0;´ t > 0) Suppose that prices are rigid
and the open market constraint is binding. Then an interest rate policy satisfying b Rt = ½¼b ¼t
is associated with a unique rational expectations equilibrium path converging to the steady
state i¤
½¼ < ½¼,w i t h ½¼ ´
(1 ¡ #)R + #
(1 ¡ #)R
> 1:
11A similar outcome can occur in a sticky price model with overlapping generations (see Leith and Wren-
Lewis, 2000).
18Proof. In the case of the interest rate policy, the matrices in the general form of the 2 £ 2

















The characteristic polynomial of M¡1
0 M1 which is given by f(±a)=±2
a ¡f (°1[(1 ¡ °2)½¼ +
1] + 1 + ¯)±a ¡ (1 + °1½¼)g=¯ is positive at ±a =0:f(0) = 1
¯ (1 + °1½¼) > 0 and is negative
at ±a =0for ½¼ < 1=°2 : f(1) =
°1
¯ (°2½¼ ¡ 1). Hence, the model exhibits one stable and one
unstable eigenvalue if ½¼ <¼ = (¼ ¡ #) = [((1 ¡ #)R + #]=[(1 ¡ #)R]. ¥
The stability condition presented in proposition 11 reveals that the model is stable regardless
of ½¼ when the …scal authority runs a balanced budget policy (# =1 ). On the contrary, a non-
Ricardian regime (# =0 ) would require a passive interest rate policy to escape explosiveness.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We developed a business cycle model with repurchase agreements, where only government
bonds are accepted as collateral for money. When private debt earns a higher interest than
government bonds, agents care about open market operations and the monetary stance de-
pends on the nominal interest rate and the amount of government bonds outstanding. The
model is able to generate a real and nominal expansion in response to monetary injections
and solves the so-called liquidity puzzle regardless of prices being sticky or ‡exible. An in-
terest rate peg is not associated with indeterminacy of the price level or the equilibrium.
However, given that public debt holdings a¤ects households’ access to money, debt policy
interacts with monetary policy in that a low tax to debt ratio can destabilize the economy
when interest rate setting is highly reactive to the state.
196 Appendix
6.1 Allowing for money accumulation
In this appendix, we examine when households are not willing to carry over money from
one period to another. For this, we allow for households to accumulate cash Mh(j;st) ¸ 0
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where » m e a s u r e st h eo p p o r t u n i t yc o s t so fc a s hh o l d i n g s . M a x i m i z a t i o nt h e nl e a d st ot h e


























=0 ;» (j;st) ¸ 0;M h(j;st) ¡ Mh(j;st¡1) ¸ 0;
where a positive value »(j;st) implies that households are not willing to accumulate cash

















Given that ´(j;st) (and »(j;st)) cannot be negative, the multiplier »(j;st) can only be non-
positive if either expected value of ´(j;st) times the real interest rate on government bonds
20exactly o¤sets ´(j;st)=¯ or if ´(j;st)=Et´(j;st+1)=0 . Before we derive a su¢cient condi-
tion which ensures that money is not accumulated, we will …rst demonstrate that households
a r ei n d i ¤ e r e n ti nt h i sr e g a r dw h e nt h el a t t e rh o l d s .
Suppose that ´(j;st)=Et´(j;st+1)=0holds implying that open market operations are
irrelevant and that R(st)=Rd(st). Then the (38) reads »(j;st)¡¯Et[»(j;st+1)=¼(st+1)] = 0.
Consider the case where prices are ‡exible such that wages are constant w(st)=w =
²¡1
² such that the households conditions (11) and (12) imply that consumption is con-





=0 .W h e n ½ =0 , the term in the square brack-
ets is strictly positive implying that the multiplier »(j;st) must be equal to zero.12
To ensure that households are not willing to carry over cash from one period to the other
it is su¢cient for our purpose, i.e., analysis of the local dynamic properties, to derive a
particular condition for an equilibrium with a time invariant state s.F o rst = st+1 = s,t h e





which implies that household j is not willing to accumulate money if Rd(s)¡R(s) > 0 given
that a binding budget constraint (8) implies ¸(j;s) > 0. Hence, in a steady state where
the open market constraint (9) holds with equality (´>0, see proposition 4), households
will voluntarily acquire money exclusively via repurchase agreements such that money is not
carried over to the next period.
6.2 Steady state
The steady state of the model is assumed be characterized by stationary values for ¸; c; ¼;
























Further, ¹ and # are set by the central bank and the …scal authority, respectively.
12Note that we assumed R(s
t) > 1 to hold in equilibrium (see de…nition 1).
216.3 Derivation of the aggregate supply constraint
Using a simple price rule for the fraction Á of the …rms (Pit = ¼Pit¡1), the price index for
the …nal good Pt evolves recursively over time. In a symmetric equilibrium we obtain the
following condition for the evolution of the price level: P
1¡²
t = Á(¼Pt¡1)
1¡² +( 1¡ Á) e P1¡²
t ,







¢1¡² +( 1¡ Á) e Pqt
1¡²
i 1







where b x denotes the percent deviation of x from its steady state value x. Linearization of (39)
at the steady state leads to:
Á
1¡Áb ¼t = b e Pqt. Further, we transform the …rst order condition






















where mct = Pw
t =Pt denotes the retailer’s real marginal costs and ¼t;t+s denotes a cumulative





















s mcy¼¡²s¼s²Et [b zt;t+s + b yt+s +(² +1 )b ¼t;t+s + c mct+s]:
Using e Pq
²¡1
² = mc and substituting e Pq out with
Á








s Et [b ¼t;t+s + c mct+s]: (42)
Taking the period t +1v e r s i o no f( 4 2 )t i m e s¯Á and substracting from (42), gives:
Á
(1 ¡ Á)
(b ¼t ¡ ¯ÁEt [b ¼t+1]) = (1 ¡ ¯Á)
Ã




s Et [¡b ¼t+1]
!
: (43)
Rewriting equation (43) leads to the ’New Keynesian Phillips Curve’ (30).
6.4 Proof of proposition 6
Using the general solution form in (37) to replace the endogenous variables in the equilibrium
equations (31)-(35), we obtain the following conditions for the undetermined coe¢cients ±a,
22±¼a, ±a",a n d±a" e¤ects
°1±a + ¯±¼a±a ¡ ±¼a=0;° 1±a" + ¯±¼a±a" + °1
¼
#
¡ ±¼" =0 ;









#°1 +( # ¡ ¼)(1¡ ±a)¯
°1 + ¯ (1 ¡ ±a)+( 1¡ ¯½)
;± a" = ¡
1
#
°1¼ +( 1¡ ¯½)(¼ ¡ #)
°1 + ¯ (1 ¡ ±a)+( 1¡ ¯½)
< 0:
Hence, ±a" is strictly positive when #°1 +(# ¡ ¼)(1¡ ±a)¯>0.U s i n gt h a t¹ is assumed to
be strictly smaller than ¹ ´ #=[1 ¡ (1 ¡ #)=¯], we can conclude that ±a" is strictly positive
if #>1 ¡ ¯°1=(1 ¡ ±a + °1). The coe¢cient ±a" is further used together with the solution





"t, to derive the impact multiplier on consumption and real




#(1 ¡ ¯½)+¼¯(1 ¡ ±a)
°1 + ¯ (1 ¡ ±a)+( 1¡ ¯½)
> 0:
Combining the conditions (34) and (35) further gives b Rt = ¡(¹=#)"t and, thus, ±r" = ¡¹=# <
0, which completes the proof of proposition 6. ¥
6.5 Proof of proposition 7
When open market operations are not binding the model given in de…nition 2 can be reduced
to the following 2 £ 2 system in real balances and in‡ation,
°1 b mt + ¯Etb ¼t+1 = b ¼t (44)
b mt = b mt¡1 ¡ b ¼t + b ¹t; with b ¹t = ½b ¹t¡1 + "t: (45)
Given that real balances b mt¡1 are predetermined, real determinacy requires the existence of































The characteristic polynomial of (Mc
0)
¡1 Mc
1,t h u s ,r e a d sf(X)=X2 +
¡¯¡°1¡1
¯ X + 1
¯.A s
f(0) is equal to 1=¯ and, therefore, strictly positive and f(1) is negative f(1) = ¡°1=¯ < 0,
the model exhibits exactly one stable eigenvalue lying between zero and one. In order to
establish the claims made in part 1 and 2 of the proposition, we use the following general
23form for the fundamental solution of the model:
b mt = ±mb mt¡1 + ±m¹b ¹t; b ¼t = ±¼mb mt¡1 + ±¼¹b ¹t: (46)
The solution form (46) is then used to replace the endogenous variables in (44) and (45),
yielding the following conditions for the undetermined coe¢cients ±m;± m¹;± ¼m; and ±¼¹
°1±m + ¯±¼m±m ¡ ±¼m=0;± ¼¹ ¡ °1±m¹ ¡ ¯±¼m±m¹ ¡ ¯±¼¹½ =0 ;
±m + ±¼m ¡ 1=0;± m¹ + ±¼¹ ¡ 1=0 :
Using that 0 <± m < 1 is already established, the claims made in part 1 follow from the
following expressions for the coe¢cients ±m¹;± ¼m; and ±¼¹
±¼¹ =[ °1 + ¯ (1 ¡ ±m)]=°3 > 0; 0 <± m¹ =( 1¡ ¯½)=°3 < 1; 0 <± ¼m =1¡±m < 1;
where °3 ´ 1 ¡ ¯½ + °1 + ¯ (1 ¡ ±m) > 0. Turning to part 2 of the proposition, we want
to derive the sign of the interest rate response @ b Rt=@b ¹t. For this, we apply the following
structural equation which governs the nominal interest rate response for ´t =0(see de…nition
2): b Rt = ¾(b ct+1 ¡ b ct)+Etb ¼t+1. Using the cash-constraint and the constant money growth
rule, we obtain the condition b Rt = ¾½b ¹t+(1¡¾)Etb ¼t+1, which determines the nominal interest
rate for given sequences of in‡ation, real balances, and the money growth rate. Applying the
solution form (46) the fundamental solution, thus, reads
b Rt = ±rmb mt¡1+±r¹b ¹t; with ±rm ´ (1¡¾)(1¡ ¯½)[(1¡ ±m) ¡ ½]=°3+½, ±r¹ ´ (1¡¾)±¼m±m:
Given that we are interested in the case, where ¾ takes reasonable values (¾ ¸ 1), it can
immediately be seen that the impact response @ b Rt=@b ¹t = ±rm cannot be negative if ½ ¸ 1¡±m.
Hence, we consider the case where (1 ¡ ±m) >½ . Then, the partial derivative of the coe¢cient
±rm with respect to ½, which reads,
@±rm
@½
=( ¾ ¡ 1)
(°1 + ¯ (1 ¡ ±m)) ¢ [¯ [(1 ¡ ±m) ¡ ½]+( 1¡ ¯½)] + (1 ¡ ¯½)
2
[1 ¡ ¯½+ °1 + ¯ (1 ¡ ±m)]
2 +1> 0;
is positive such that ±rm rises with the autocorrelation of the money growth rate for this
case. However, the coe¢cient ±rm can take negative values for a su¢ciently large values for
¾ : ¾>¾ . The lower bound ¾ can be expressed as a function of ½, ±m, ¯ and °1
¾(½)=
½°1 +( 1¡ ±m)
(1 ¡ ¯½)[(1¡ ±m) ¡ ½]
,w i t h ¾(½) ¸ 1;¾ 0(½) > 0 8½ 2 (0;1 ¡ ±m):
This completes the proof of the claims made in the proposition. ¥
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